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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear and
determine this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 782a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial
court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the First
Cause of Action asserted in Plaintiffs1 Complaint.

On appeal

from the entry of summary judgment, the only determinations
required are "whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that
there were no disputed issues of material fact."

Ferree v.

State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
This is an action for damages in which Plaintiffs Leon W.
Robinson and Arlene Robinson (the "Robinsons") have asserted
causes of action alleging fraud, conversion and fraudulent
conveyance.

The Complaint commencing this action was filed on

May 15, 1992.

Defendants filed their Answer and Third Party

Complaint on May 29, 1992.
On February 12, 1993, the Robinsons filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum of points and
authorities.

Defendants filed their Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on February 24, 1993, and the Robinsons filed
their Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on March 8,
1993.
A hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
held before the trial court on April 16, 1993.

On April 29,

1993, the trial court entered its Order Granting Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

On that same date, the trial court

entered Judgment against Defendants Kerry Rick Hubble
(hereinafter "Hubble") and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc.
(hereinafter "WBS"), jointly and severally, in the principal
amount of $24,780.56.
Defendants Hubble and WBS timely filed their Notice of
Appeal on May 5, 1993.
B, Statement of Facts
1.

Approximately four years prior to the commencement of

the case at bar, on February 22, 1988, an Amended Judgment was
entered in favor of the Robinsons and against Hubble in Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, case number C-87-3023.

The total principal amount of the

Judgment was $27,280.56. (R. 164).
2.

At the time of the entry of the Amended Judgment, Hubble

was the record owner of certain real property located in Summit
County, Utah, more particularly described as: Lot 63, Summit Park
Plat "J" (Lot 63) (hereinafter referred to as the "Summit County
Property").

(R. 003, paragraph 8; and R. 014, paragraph 9 ) .
2

3.

On March 4, 1988, the Robinsons properly filed and

recorded a transcript of the Amended Judgment with the Clerk of
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State
of Utah.

(R. 105). Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-22-1,

the Amended Judgment became a lien on the Summit County Property.
4.

On or about December 24, 1991, Hubble entered into an

Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the "First Earnest Money
Agreement") with one Glen Hanson pursuant to which Hubble agreed
to sell the Summit County Property to Hanson for the purchase
price of $60,000.00.
5.

(R. 106).

Sometime between Hubblefs execution of the First Earnest

Money Agreement on December 24, 1991, and January 27, 1992,
Hubble discovered the Robinsons' judgment lien. (R. 109, lines 223).
6.

On or about January 27, 1992, a Complaint purporting to

be filed on behalf of Defendant Kay Gneiting ("Gneiting"), as
plaintiff, was filed in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Summit County, State of Utah, civil no. 92-11322 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Foreclosure Action"), in which the named
Defendants were Hubble, the Robinsons, and a person claiming an
equitable lien on the Summit County Property by the name of Jim
Quinn.

(R. 120). Gneiting was an employee of WBS.

the General Manager and a shareholder of WBS.

Hubble is

(R. 118, lines 24-

25; and R. 013, paragraph 4 ) .
7.

Attached as an Exhibit to the Complaint in the

Foreclosure Action was a "Mortgage" which had been filed of
3

record in the Summit County Recorder's Office on November 13,
1987, and in which Gneiting, as Mortgagor, purports to grant
Hubble, as Mortgagee, a mortgage on the Summit County Property in
the amount of $37,000.00 payable as follows:
Quarterly interest payments in the amount of $370.00
commencing November 15, 1987 ... The total unpaid principal
balance together with accrued interest will be due in full
on or before August 15, 1989.
(R. 126).
8.

In the First Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action,

Gneiting asserted a claim for "Reformation", alleging the
existence of the above referenced Mortgage, and further alleging
that:
Neither [Gneiting] nor
or a title company and
Kerry R. Hubble should
obligated to make payment
mortgagee to whom money

[Hubble] were represented by counsel
the mortgage is prepared incorrectly.
show as the mortgagor and the person
and Kay Gneiting should show as the
is owed.

(R. 122, paragraph 11)(emphasis added).
9.

In the Second Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action,

Gneiting asserted a claim for "Mortgage Foreclosure", alleging
the existence of the Mortgage, that Gneiting should be the
Mortgagee and Hubble the Mortgagor, and that:
The Defendant Hubble has failed to make payment of the
$37,000.00, together with interest at the pre-judgment rate
of 10% per annum, and there is now due and owing ... the sum
of $53,421.92.
(R. 122, paragraph 14).
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10.

In the Third Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action,

Gneiting asserted a claim for "Quiet Title", alleging that:
All of the right title and interest of [Gneiting] to the
[Summit County Property] is superior to the claim of all
other parties Defendant [including the Robinsons]...
(R. 123, paragraph 21).
11.

In his deposition taken in the case at bar on December 2, 1992,

Gneiting testified that all of the material allegations asserted in the Foreclosure

Action Complaint were false. Specifically, Gneiting testified that:
a. the Mortgage was prepared to memorialize an
agreement between Gneiting and Hubble whereby Gneiting (not
Hubble) was going to purchase the property for the sum of
$37,000.00. (R. 110, lines 15-19).
b. However, Gneiting was never able to make the
payments called for under the Mortgage and, therefore, Gneiting
had lost any interest he might have had in the Summit County
Property prior to 1990 when he filed for relief in bankruptcy
court and failed to list the Summit County Property on his
bankruptcy schedules. (R. 117, lines 19-25; R. 115, line 17
through R. 116, line 8).
c. Hubble never owed Gneiting $37,000.00 as alleged in
the Complaint.

Further, Gneiting never told the attorney who

filed the Foreclosure Action that Hubble owed him any money. (R.
Ill, lines 9-10; R. 112, line 23 through R. 113, line 2).

The

only money that Hubble ever owed Gneiting in connection with the
Summit County Property was the $2,000.00 Gneiting was paid by

5

Hubble and/or WBS to go along with Hubble f s scheme to defraud the
Robinsons. (R. Ill, lines 12-25; R. 113, lines 15-18; R. 114,
lines 17-21; R. 118, line 2 through R. 119, line 25).
12.

After filing the Foreclosure Action, Gneitingfs counsel

contacted the Robinsons, falsely represented to them that
Gneitingfs interest in the property was superior to theirs, and
offered to pay the Robinsons $2,500.00 to release their judgment
lien against the Summit County Property.

In reliance upon

Gneiting?s counsel's misrepresentation, the Robinsons released
their judgment lien.
13.

(R. 127-133).

Notwithstanding the fact that Gneiting had no interest

in the Summit County Property and the fact that Hubble never owed
Gneiting any money with respect to the property, Gneiting
obtained the District Court's Judgment And Order reforming the
subject Mortgage "to substitute the Plaintiff, Kay Gneiting, as
the mortgagee and Kerry R. Hubble as the mortgagor."

(R. 135-

136).
14.

Gneiting also filed a second Stipulation And Settlement

Agreement in the Foreclosure Action in which Hubble professed to
stipulate that he would not contest the Foreclosure Action "and
that a judgment and order of foreclosure may be entered against
[Hubble] reforming the mortgage ... and allowing [Gneiting] to
foreclose the mortgage ..."
15.

(R. 138-139).

After fraudulently obtaining the District Court's

Judgment And Order reforming the Mortgage and quieting title in
Gneiting, a second Earnest Money Sales Agreement was prepared in
6

connection with the Summit County Property, this time identifying
Gneiting as the owner/seller, but containing the same material
terms as those contained in the First Earnest Money Sales
Agreement which had identified Hubble as the owner/seller.

(R.

141).
16.

On or about March 3, 1992, Gneitingfs sale of the

Summit County Property closed and a check (No. 3689) in the
amount of $47,139.60

drawn on Park City Title Company's trust

account was issued to Gneiting.

(R. 143). Gneiting immediately

purchased a cashier!s check made payable to WBS and handed the
check over to Hubble. (R. 114, lines 17-21).

In his deposition,

Gneiting explained as follows:
Q.

What did you do with the cashier's check?

A.

Gave it to Wilderness Building Systems.

Q.

Why?

A.

Because it wasn't mine.

•• •

Q.

So this $47,000 was never yours?

A. No.
(R. 114, line 17 through R. 115, line 5).

Gneiting further

testified that the reason he turned the sales proceeds over to
WBS was that Hubble owned the property:
Q.

Is that correct, to your knowledge, that Mr. Hubble

owned the property?
A.

Yes...

Q.

How did you know that?
7

A.

Well, it was just why I turned the check over to them.

(R. 118, lines 13-21).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. There is no genuine dispute with respect to the facts
necessary to establish the Robinsons' fraud claim.
In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the
Robinsons relied on the above referenced admissions contained in
Gneiting's deposition testimony and upon certain documentary
evidence the truth and accuracy of which were admitted by
Defendants.

The evidence presented clearly established the

elements of the Robinsons' fraud claim.
Defendants, however, failed to file affidavits or other
materials in opposition to the Robinsons1 motion.

Instead, they

relied upon the allegations contained in their pleadings and upon
select portions of Gneiting*s deposition testimony.
As a matter of law, the allegations set forth in Defendants1
pleadings were not sufficient to raise a factual issue, and the
excerpts from Gneiting?s deposition testimony upon which
Defendants rely do not raise any material issues of fact.
B. The trial court correctly applied the governing law.
In order to prevail on their fraud claim, the Robinsons were
required to establish each of the nine elements set forth in
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App.
1992).

The undisputed facts of this case clearly and

convincingly establish each of these nine elements.

8

C. The Robinsons' judgment lien rode through Hubblefs
bankruptcy proceedings unaffected.
Although HubbleTs personal liability to the Robinsons was
extinguished by his bankruptcy filing, the Robinsons1 judgment
lien rode through the bankruptcy proceedings unaffected.
Accordingly, Hubblefs bankruptcy filing is irrelevant with
respect to the question of the propriety of the entry of summary
judgment in the case at bar.
D. Defendants' "accord and satisfaction" and "estoppel"
defenses do not create issues of fact precluding summary
judgment.
The facts which form the basis for Defendants' "accord and
satisfaction" and "estoppel" defenses are undisputed.

The

application of those defenses to the undisputed facts of this
case was a matter of law.

The trial court properly concluded

that accord and satisfaction and estoppel were not valid defenses
with respect to the Robinsons1 fraud claim.
E. The trial court complied with Rule 52(a).
The Robinsons1 motion for partial summary judgment was based
on only one ground: their fraud claim.

Accordingly, pursuant to

Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., the trial court was not required to enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a brief written
statement.
ARGUMENT
A. There is no genuine dispute with respect to the facts
necessary to establish the Robinsons1 fraud claim.
Defendants attempt to create an issue of fact by asserting
that there is a question with respect to the ownership of the
g

Summit County Property at the time of the filing of the
Foreclosure Action.

Specifically, Defendants rely on paragraph 9

of their Answer to the Robinsons! Complaint in which they admit
that Hubble was the record owner of the property, but allege that
"said lot was sold to Kevin Kay Gneiting in approximately August
of 1987."

(R. 014).

Defendants1 reliance is misplaced.

The allegations

contained in their pleadings may not be relied upon by Defendants
to create an issue of fact.

Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224

(Utah 1983).
Defendants also rely on Gneitingfs deposition testimony to
the effect that Gneiting and Hubble had entered into an agreement
in or around 1987 whereby Gneiting was to purchase the Summit
County Property from Hubble, first by making quarterly
installment payments of $370.00 and later, after Gneiting was
unable to afford the payments, by providing labor to Hubble.
Defendants1 bad faith is transparent.

In the Complaint

filed in the Foreclosure Action, Gneiting alleged that "Kerry R.
Hubble should show as the mortgagor and the person obligated to
make payment and Kay Gneiting should show as the mortgagee to
whom money is owed." (R. 122, paragraph 11).

In other words, in

the Foreclosure Action Gneiting alleged that it was Hubble who
bought the property from him, not he who bought the property from
Hubble.

In order to establish his right to foreclosure, Gneiting

further alleged that:
"The Defendant Hubble has failed to make payment of the
$37,000.00 [which he allegedly owed to Gneiting] ...
in

and there is now due and owing ... the sum of
$53,421.92.
(R. 122, paragraph 14).
In his deposition, however, Gneiting admitted that the
allegations of the Complaint in the Foreclosure Action were lies;
that Hubble never owed him any money and that he had lost any
interest which he might have had in the property long before the
Foreclosure Action was filed.
119-25).

(R. Ill, lines 9-10; R. 117, lines

Gneiting also testified that the reason why he gave

Hubble the $47,139.60 net proceeds from the sale of the property
was because Hubble owned the property:
Q. What did you do with the [$47,000] cashier's check?
A. Gave it to Wilderness Building Systems.
Q. Why?
A. Because it wasn't mine.
•• •

Q. So this $47,000 was never yours?
A. No.
.. .

Q. Is that correct to your knowledge, that Mr. Hubble owned
the property?

Q. How did you know that?
A. Well, it was just why I turned the check over to them.
(R. 114, line 17 through R. 115, line 5; and R. 118, lines 1321).
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For Defendants to argue now that Gneiting's testimony
supports their contention that there is an issue of fact with
respect to the ownership of the property is preposterous and
merely serves to demonstrate Defendants' repeated willingness to
misrepresent the ownership of the property to suit their
particular purpose at the time*

Gneiting has admitted (and

neither of the other Defendants has disputed) that he was unable
to follow through on his agreement to purchase the property and
that he had lost any interest he might have had in the property
long before the filing of the Foreclosure Action.
B. The trial court correctly applied the governing law.
As demonstrated above, in December of 1991, Hubble was the
record owner of the Summit County Property.

When Hubble

attempted to sell the property in December of 1991, however, he
discovered that the Robinsons1 judgment lien encumbered the
property to the tune of approximately $40,000.00.

In order to

avoid having to satisfy the Robinsons' judgment lien out of the
sales proceeds, Hubble had his employee, Gneiting, file the
Foreclosure Action fraudulently misrepresenting that Gneiting,
not Hubble, was the mortgagee under a recorded Mortgage
instrument; further fraudulently misrepresenting that Hubble owed
Gneiting in excess of $53,000.00 under the Mortgage; and further
fraudulently misrepresenting that Hubble had failed and refused
to pay Gneiting the $53,000.00 plus owed to Gneiting.
Based upon these admittedly false representations, Gneiting
obtained the District Court's Judgment And Order reforming the
1O

Mortgage to allow him to foreclose on the property, title to
which was also quieted in Gneiting's name.

Gneiting then sold

the property for $60,000.00, receiving a check from Park City
Title Company's trust account for the net sales proceeds in the

sum of $47,139.60, with which he immediately purchased a cashier's check
payable to WBS, which he then immediately turned over to Hubble.

Hubble

paid Gneiting $2,000.00 for his participation in Hubble?s scheme
to defraud the Robinsons, or, as Gneiting described the plan:
"I didn't sell [the Summit County Property]. What it
was was the paperwork was made backwards. The [Summit
County Property] was in my name to where the check was
made out to me when it was sold."
(R. 113, lines 16-18).
The admitted and obvious purpose of Defendants' scheme was
to avoid having to satisfy the Robinsons' judgment lien out of
the proceeds from the sale of the Summit County Property by
fraudulently misrepresenting Gneiting's interest in the property.
Thus, the undisputed facts before the trial court clearly
and convincingly established each of the nine elements of fraud
set forth in Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62, 66
(Utah App. 1992): (1) Defendants represented that Gneiting was
the owner of the Summit County Property; (2) Defendants'
representation concerned a then presently existing material fact;
(3) Defendants' representation was false; (4) Defendants knew
their representation was false; (5) Defendants' misrepresentation
was made for the purpose of inducing the Robinsons to execute the
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 127) and Partial
13

Releases of Judgment Liens (R. 130-132); (6) the Robinsons,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in
fact rely upon Defendants1 misrepresentation; (8) in executing
the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and the Partial Releases
of Liens; (9) to their injury and damage.
Accordingly, the trial court properly applied the law in
granting the Robinsons' summary judgment with respect to their
fraud claim.
C. The Robinsons' judgment lien rode through Hubble?s
bankruptcy proceedings unaffected.
Before the trial court, Defendants argued that the
Robinsons' judgment lien had been extinguished by Hubble ? s
bankruptcy. (R. 155). Defendants have apparently abandoned that
argument and now contend that

lf

[i]n order for the Robinsons to

properly pursue their judgment against Hubble and seek to have
the dischargeability of said debt denied, it would have been
necessary for them to file a complaint objecting to discharge in
the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which was never done."1
Defendants1 contention is without merit.
It is well recognized that "liens pass through bankruptcy
unaffected." Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773, 778 (1992); see also
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991)("Ordinarily,
liens and other secured interests survive bankruptcy"); and
Johnson v. Home, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991)("... a bankruptcy
discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim -^rief of Appellants - Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness
Building Systems, Inc., at pp. 22-23.
1 A

namely, an action against the debtor in personam -- while leaving
intact another -- namely, an action against the debtor in rem").
It was, therefore, not necessary for the Robinsons to file a
non-dischargeability action in the bankruptcy court in order to
preserve their judgment lien.
D. Defendants' "accord and satisfaction" and "estoppel"
defenses do not create issues of fact precluding summary
judgment.
Defendants' contention that their "accord and satisfaction"
and "estoppel" defenses created an issue of fact precluding
summary judgment is meritless.

The facts upon which Defendants

base their defenses are undisputed.

The application of the

doctrines of estoppel and accord and satisfaction to the
undisputed facts is a matter of law.

The trial court properly

rejected Defendants' argument that estoppel and accord and
satisfaction constitute valid defenses to the Robinsons' fraud
claim.
E. The trial court complied with Rule 52(a).
Although not explicitly stated in their moving papers, the
Robinsons' motion for partial summary judgment was based upon
only one ground: the fraud claim set forth in the First Cause of
Action alleged in the Complaint.

(R. 102). No argument was made

and no authority was cited which would have supported the entry
of judgment on the Robinsons' conversion and fraudulent
conveyance claims.

The trial court understood that the Robinsons

were seeking summary judgment only in connection with their fraud
claim.

(R. 342, lines 1 through 19). Likewise, Defendants
15

understood that the Robinsons were seeking summary judgment only
in connection with their fraud claim.

(R. 330, lines 20-24).

Accordingly, because the Robinsons' motion was based upon
only one ground, the trial court was not required to enter
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a brief written
statement of the grounds for its decision.

Rule 52(a), Utah R.

Civ. P.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Robinsons respectfully request
that the Judgment entered by the trial court be affirmed.
DATED this /y^^day of March, 1994.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was
mailed this /Q*1* day of March, 1994, via first class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Kent L. Christiansen, Esq.
300 IBM Plaza
420 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84^11
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Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.

126

Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rei. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. 'Pfiomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial <s=> 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
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Rule 52

ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Caption.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
EfTect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
" Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.

Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.
—Ultimate facts.
Summary judgment.
—Statement of grounds.
Waiver.
—Failure of court.
When filed.
—Tardy filing.
Cited.
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
In a contract action by a real estate broker
for his commission, where the defendant raises
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his
answer, the court should make findings on the
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact on ail material issues
is reversible error where it is prejudicial.
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278
P.2d 284 (1954).
—Advisory verdict.
The trial court has the responsibility to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury.
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d
392 (Utah 1980).
—Breach of contract.
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of contract, requested finding by court on material
issue as to whether the foundation of their
house had been located in accordance with zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants, it
was the duty of the court to make such a finding. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

set aside must proffer some defense of at least
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on
that issue. Downey State Bank v. MajorBlakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).
—Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a
summons, and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original, the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should have been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
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promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «s=> 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
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Rule 56

pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Affidavit.
Damages.
—Contents.
Discovery.
—Corporation.
Disputed
facts.
—Experts.
Evidence.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Facts considered.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
—Improper evidence.
Resting on pleadings.
—Proof.
—Objection.
—Weight of testimony.
—Sufficiency.
Improper party plaintiff.
rHearsay and opinion testimony
Issue of fact.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Corporate existence.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Deeds.
—Verified pleading.
—Lease as security.
—Waiver of right to contest.
Judicial attitude.
—When unavailable.
Motion for new trial.
Exclusive control of facts.
Motion to dismiss.
—Who may make.
Motion to reconsider.
Affirmative defense.
Notice.
Answers to interrogatories.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
Appeal.
—Waiver of defect.
—Adversely affected party.
Procedural due process.
—Standard of review.
Purpose.
Attorney's fees.
ANALYSIS

